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Abstract
The paper presents the results of a Longitudinal Lab-in-the-Field Experiment
implemented between September 2015 and July 2016 in two State Prisons in
California (USA). A subset of eligible inmates willing to undertake GRIP (Guiding
Rage Into Power), an “offender accountability program”, were randomly assigned
to it. The paper tests whether the participation to this program (used as a treatment
in the experiments), based on building strong relationships and mutual help,
affects prosocial preferences of participants, with specific reference to trust. The
results of a Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimation procedure show that trust
significantly increased in GRIP participants compared to the control group. This
result is robust to alternative estimation techniques and to the inclusion of an
endogenous behavioral measure of altruism.
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1 Introduction
The United States of America notably host the largest correctional population in
the world (Walmsley et al., 2013). High incarceration rates entail huge social and
economic consequences for inmates and their families and also for the entire society,
since prosocial attitudes can seriously decline in prison. In particular, long-term
imprisonment leads to the so-called process of “prisonization” (Naderi, 2014), that
produces both psychological and behavioral effects1(Haney et al., 2003), affecting
inmates’ ability to trust people (McCorkle, 1992) and hampering the possibility of
effective resocialization (Zingraff, 1975). These negative individual psychological and
behavioral effects hinder the effective reintegration of inmates in local communities
and cause a process of social exclusion (Morenoff and Harding, 2014; Wakefield and
Uggen, 2010; Lynch and Sabol, 2004) which in turn exacerbates the decrease in their
prosocial behavior (Twenge et al., 2007), eventually contributing to recidivism (Figlio
et al., 1972; Durose et al., 2015).
Within the US national framework, California hosts the second largest prison
population in the country and represents a specially interesting case, since it has
embarked, together with New York and New Jersey, on one of the most relevant prison
downsizing experiment adopted during the last decade (Newman and Scott, 2011).
Facing a U.S. Supreme Court decision, which ordered the State of California to reduce
its prison population by a quarter within two years, in 2011 Governor Jerry Brown
signed the Public Safety Realignment Act which propelled a number of measures
aimed at achieving this target by transferring lower-level offenders from state to county
prisons, and supporting a number of evidence-based community corrections programs
(Petersilia, 2014, p. 802).
This paper aims at testing whether the participation to an offender accountability
program (GRIP2), run by the US-based NGO Insight-Out, significantly changes prosocial
attitudes of violent crime offenders, with a special focus on trust3. It is worthwhile
stressing that this paper does not directly aim at testing the impact or effectiveness of
the program in reaching its core targets4; but rather uses behavioral economics games,
within an experimental setting, to measure effects of the program on changing inmates’
prosocial preferences and attitudes. In particular, we focus on generalized trust, since
it is widely acknowledged (Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997;
Warren, 1999; Guiso et al., 2008; Grimalda and Mittone, 2011) as one of the ingredients
of well-functioning societies, efficient and growing economic systems and effective
participative institutions.
The way Insight-Out administers the program particularly fits the requirements
1These effects are not necessarily pathological, rather normal adaptive processes to abnormal de-
mands, due to the highly insecure and stressful prison’s environment. See Haney et al. (2003) for a
detailed survey of the psychological processes occurring during long-term imprisonment.
2GRIP is the acronym for Guiding Rage Into Power an offender accountability program which is
currently administered in seven Californian prisons and involves around 500 inmates. See more detail
about GRIP in the dedicated section 2.
3In a somehow similar experimental setting, Blattman et al. (2017) investigates the “malleability” of
a number of noncognitive skills and preferences in criminally engaged adults.
4That would be mostly based on evidence of low or no recidivism for inmates “graduated” in the
program.
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for an experimental setting. The NGO’s limited capacity (until 2016 Insight-Out has
been able to manage only one GRIP class of about 25 inmates per prison each year)
allows the implementation of a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment5 involving 42 treated
(inmates participant to GRIP) and 38 controls (inmates not attending the program), in
two Californian State prisons. All 80 inmates were surveyed twice, the first time before
the beginning of GRIP and the second time about ten months later (after the end of
the program). The experimental protocol, designed to run a panel data Difference-in-
Differences analysis, envisaged a set of behavioral games, devised to elicit prosocial
behavior (and in particular altruism and trust) and a series of questions based on a set
of validated psychological scales of forgiveness and self-forgiveness6.
The novelty of our contribution is threefold:
1. we implemented a longitudinal study in the framework of prosocial behavioral
games, addressing a promising, but still little investigated7, research question
concerning the change of prosocial attitudes and preferences over time, with
reference to trust and altruism, experienced by people exposed to a “rehab”
program;
2. we devised an “augmented” experimental setting in which we analyse trust by
controlling for an endogenously determined characteristic of the inmates, by
including, as a covariate in the DID model specification, the outcome of a Dictator
Game (as proxy for altruism) in the baseline survey;
3. we applied a behavioral economics set of games to a non-standard marginalized
adult population (prison inmates) and are able to show that trust significantly
increased after taking part to an offender accountability program.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 outlines the main features of the GRIP
program, highlighting its core targets; section 3 presents the research design and
experimental methods; section 4 presents the methodology to estimate the Average
effect of the Treatment on the Treated (ATT); section 5 provides results and robustness
checks, and section 6 provides a discussion of the main findings and conclusions.
5Following the taxonomy proposed by Harrison and List (2004), a Lab-Like Field or Lab-in-the-Field
experiment involves participants drawn from the field and asks them “to perform laboratory tasks that
are not part of their day-to-day environment.”(Viceisza, 2016, p. 836)
6The forgiveness-related questions are not analyzed in this paper due to their different nature and
scope. Therefore, we have postponed their illustration to a future work.
7A recent survey shows that while the stability of risk and time preferences have been extensively
studied, social preferences are investigated by only 4 papers, and only two of them address trust and
altruism, based on a very limited sample of university students (Chuang and Schechter, 2015, Table 3,
p. 154).
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2 Guiding Rage Into Power (GRIP): outline of the reha-
bilitation program
Jacques Verduin has been running the GRIP (Guiding Rage Into Power) Program in San
Quentin Prison (California, USA) since 20118, the founder of Insight-Out, an NGO
based in the San Francisco’s area. GRIP originates from its founder’s vision that the
lack of relations is the main driver of violence and unlawful behavior9 and is classified
as an “offender accountability program”, according to the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)10. GRIP aims at providing inmates with the
skills to undo and prevent violent behavior so to become “agents of change”, i.e. “people
with skills to defuse conflicts around them”11. In particular, the program focuses on
the origins of behaviors and habits that are conducive to crime, with the specific
purpose of undoing “the characteristic destructive behavioral patterns (...) that lead to
transgressions12”. The program usually spans over an “academic year”, roughly ten
months long (between September and July) and develops through weekly/fortnightly
lessons, each one focused on a specific topic, aiming at (1) stopping violent behavior,
(2) cultivating mindfulness, (3) achieving emotional intelligence and (4) understanding
victim impact. GRIP targets unobservable behavioral traits, that indirectly affect other-
regarding preferences and beliefs. For this reason, the program is particularly suited to
the experimental analysis we devised: neither trust, nor altruism are explicitly “taught”
during GRIP classes, hence we expect experimental outcomes not to be driven by
inmates’ adherence to the program content13. However, both trust and altruism can
be indirectly affected by the program and the implementation of behavioral games is
especially devised to elicit them by the observed preferences in a set of task.
GRIP classes are held through a variety of didactic methods, spanning from tra-
ditional frontal lessons, to group-works and intervention of external guests14. Great
emphasis and efforts are spent on creating a strong group identification, so that GRIP
participants realize and experience that they are not alone, but part of a community
that is pursuing the same objectives15. Every cohort of GRIP participants is named
“tribe” followed by a number that consists of how many years all the men (new par-
ticipants as well as co-facilitators) have been incarcerated in any type of correctional
facility: from juvenile detention to county jails to state prisons16. The inmates are also
8His experience with prison programs is much longer: in 1997, he founded the Insight Prison Project
(IPP), pioneering innovative in-prison rehabilitation programs designed to create transformational
change among prisoners at California’s San Quentin State Prison.
9A summary of both vision and mission of Insight-Out can found on the NGO’s website. See
https://goo.gl/uMFgna for further details.
10An independent presentation of the program’s features can be found in Paulle (2017).
11See http://insight-out.org/index.php/programs/grip-program.
12ibidem.
13No reference to trust and altruism/generosity can be found in the final “Pledge”, signed by each
inmate taking part in GRIP.
14For a detailed presentation on how the GRIP program works, refer to: https://vimeo.com/
63489782.
15A recent analysis of the effectiveness of a somehow similar program (called STYL) in changing
a series of noncognitive skills and preferences of criminally engaged men in Liberia can be found in
Blattman et al. (2017)
16In a given class of around 30 men, the total often climbs higher than 600 years (Paulle, 2017). In this
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asked to work on their own or in small groups on specific assignments, in order to keep
track of their progresses in achieving the four above mentioned goals. At the end of the
course, a Graduation ceremony is held, involving inmates, relatives and the prison’s
warden. During the Graduation ceremony inmates, or “students” as they are called
throughout the program, receive their title and diploma of “peace maker”.
3 Experimental design
3.1 Identification strategy
GRIP does not target “specific” kinds of inmates, being virtually open to any inmate
who applies. Before starting each program, Insight-Out offers a program orientation
day in each prison to illustrate the main features of GRIP to all the potentially interested
inmates. After the presentation of GRIP, inmates are asked to signal their interest and
take an interview aimed at identifying mental disabilities or other severely impairing
conditions. The actual number of selected participants (usually around 25 per prison)
depends on both the NGO capacity constraints and prison security rules. This feature of
the enrollment process particularly fits the methodological requirements of a pre-/post-
treatment research design: the treatment (i.e. the participation to the program) was
randomly assigned to inmates that signaled their interest and passed the interview,
up to the filling of all available places. The random assignment of the treatment
has been implemented according to the following procedure: after the motivational
open day, Insight-Out provided us with information about the inmates (identified by
an anonymous code) interested in taking part into GRIP. We randomly assigned the
resulting pool of inmates to either treatment or control by balancing for ethnic group,
to accomplish with CDCR requirements for prison programs and with GRIP’s aim.
Henceforth, inmates enrolled in GRIP will be referred to as the “Treated” group
(T); inmates who asked to enter the program but were not enrolled because of capacity
constraints will be referred to as the “Waiting list” group (W), since, if the program
is repeated in the same prison, they will have a chance to attend the program in the
subsequent years; and, finally, inmates who attended the orientation day, but did not
show up for the interview, as the “No interview” group (N).
The experiment has been actually conducted on 80 inmates of two Californian
State Prisons (Avenal and Mule Creek), operated by the CDCR, according to the above
mentioned three sample of inmates (T, W, N)17. Since the perspective of this research
especially focuses on changes in prosocial preferences and attitudes, we devised a
longitudinal study by administering the same questionnaires twice to each inmate: the
first one in September 2015, before the start of the treatment (i.e. the GRIP program),
the second one in July 2016 after the end of the program. The first survey aimed at
measuring the initial level of the parameters of interest; the second survey aimed at
measuring whether a significant change in the parameters occurred after the treatment.
particular way each cohort obtains its unique group identification, its name, that inmates often use to
recall for years after the of the program. See Paulle (2017) for more details.
17Given the small size of the W group, compared with the T group, in the paper we use the sum of
W + N groups as the main control group in the estimation. However results in which the sole W group is
used as control are also presented as a robustness check.
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3.2 Incentivized tasks: Trust Game and Dictator Game
In order to assess whether GRIP affects the prosocial preferences and attitudes of
inmates, we devised an experimental setting that included two incentivized tasks18, a
Dictator Game and a Trust Game, that were administered separately, after instructions
had been read loud and clarification questions have been answered19.
In the Dictator Game (Kahneman et al., 1986) a Proponent is provided with an
exogenous endowment (usually a fixed monetary amount), he/she is matched to an
anonymous partner who has received no endowment, and his/her choice consists of
how to split the endowment between himself and the partner. Within the game theory
framework, assuming a Proponent with self-regarding preferences, the Dictator Game
has a unique Nash equilibrium in which the Proponent maximizes his/her payoff by
keeping all the endowment and sending 0 to the partner. Therefore, deviation from
the selfish equilibrium solution in the Dictator Game are used to measure empathy,
altruism and/or pure generosity (Forsythe et al., 1994; Camerer, 2003; Guala and
Mittone, 2010).
In the Trust Game, also known as Investment Game (Camerer and Weigelt, 1988;
Berg et al., 1995), a Proponent is provided with an exogenous endowment, and he/she
is matched to an anonymous partner who has received no endowment. His/her decision
now concerns whether and how much of his/her endowment to send to the anonymous
partner; the Proponent is also informed that the experimenter will multiply (triple)
any amount sent. The Respondent, once has received the total transfer (the amount
sent by the Proponent, duly multiplied) is then told to choose if, and how much of
the total amount received, to send back to the Proponent. Therefore, the final payoff
of the Proponent will be equal to the initial endowment, less the amount sent to the
Respondent, plus the amount sent back by the Respondent to the Proponent. This game
has a unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in which the Proponent maximizes
his/her payoff by keeping all the endowment and sending 0 to the partner: in fact,
solving by backward induction, since a selfish Respondent has no reason to send back
any strictly positive amount, the Proponent maximizes his/her payoff by keeping
the entire initial endowment. Sending a positive share of the initial endowment to
anonymous partners signals agents’ propensity to interact with unknown partners,
providing a proxy for generalized trust (Camerer, 2003; Berg et al., 1995; Johnson and
Mislin, 2011), that has been defined, as “the deliberate willingness of a decision maker
to making himself vulnerable to the actions of another party” (Sutter and Kocher, 2007,
p. 365).
Due to the impossibility of dealing with monetary payoffs (due to CDRC rules)
we devised an alternative payoff. After extensive consultation with the staff of NGOs
working within prisons in the USA, we decided to use dehydrated soups (henceforth:
soups) as rewards20. Since the experiment deals with non-monetary incentives, we
18As already mentioned in section 1, since this research is part of a broader project, the experiment
also included a series of questions based on a set of validated psychological scales of forgiveness (Mullet
et al., 2004; Chiaramello et al., 2008), and self-forgiveness (Pelucchi et al., 2013) that are not analyzed
int this paper.
19For details on the experimental procedure see supplementary materials
20Dehydrated soups are highly valuable in maximum security prisons as they allow inmates to have a
meal in the relative privacy of their cell. Moreover there is anecdotal evidence that these items are stored
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devised a control for the “use value” (soup like) and the “exchange value” (soup
value) that inmates attach to soups.
3.3 Procedures
The experiment has been implemented in paper-and-pencil, the first time in September
2015 (before the start of the program) and the second time in July 2016 (after GRIP grad-
uation took place). The experiment has been administered by six students/interviewers
purposely recruited in a local Community College21. Interviewers were thus indepen-
dent both from Insight-Out and CDCR, thus minimizing the risk of possible strategic
choices on the inmates sides. In both prisons, the same procedure has been applied, as
follows.
Inmates were gathered in a room, equipped with tables and chairs, and sat down at
an adequate distance from each other. The interviewers read aloud the instructions
of each game before administering them, making sure that everyone in the room
understood them22. Inmates were informed that only one of the games would have
been randomly drawn through the toss of a fair plastic coin at the end of the experiment
session and rewarded: in this way, each inmates had the incentive to maximize his
outcome in both games.
Both behavioral games were played in an anonymous double blind setting. Inmates
were randomly assigned a code; Insight-Out staff held records about the matching
between individual names and codes, but could not access individual outcome data (i.e.
games results); the research team could access individual outcome data, matched with
anonymous codes, but could not access individual names.
Both in the Dictator and Trust games inmates were told they would have been
randomly matched with anonymous partners. To administer the payment of the payoffs,
we devised the following protocol. Once an inmate submitted his paper sheets23, an
interviewer asked him to pick randomly one out of five “reward booklets”, randomly
taken from a pile. The booklets included the anonymous partner’s choices needed to
match the inmate’s decision in the Trust Game24. The inmate was then asked to toss a
plastic coin to select the game (either Dictator or Trust) to be rewarded and his choice
in the randomly selected game was matched with the partner’s choice. Finally, the
resulting payoff was paid in soups. On average, inmates earned 5.7 dried soups (modal
value 5). On average, each inmate took around twenty-five minutes to complete the
experimental session, administration of the rewards included.
and traded with other inmates, thus they can be thought as imperfect substitutes of money in prison.
Recent academic research provides further support for our choice: “Inmates are so unhappy with the
quality and quantity of prison food that they receive that they have begun relying on ramen noodles — a
cheap, durable food product — as a form of money in the underground economy” (Gibson-Light, 2016).
21Gavilan College, Gilroy, CA.
22Before starting the experiment, inmates were asked to play some trial sessions in order to verify
their actual understanding of the instructions.
23Including the forgiveness-related questions, not presented in this paper.
24These booklets contained the outcome of the choices of University non-academic staff (janitors,
wardens, cleaners, cooks, etc.), that were asked to play the Trust Game as Respondent in a previous
experiment run by the research team. Therefore, all the choices included in the booklet were generated
by real people, and the inmates were aware of this fact.
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4 Analysis of the Treatment Effect
4.1 Estimation technique
The experimental framework allowed to perform a Difference-in-Differences (DID)
analysis in which the change registered by the T group was compared to the change
of W (in order to control for the self-selection related to the individual willingness
a/o motivation to join the program) and, more generally, to a wider “control group”
obtained by grouping together inmates belonging to N and W groups (N+W). The
average effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT) is the effect of GRIP on the inmates
taking part into the program.
DID allows to test the ATT in a pre-/post- treatment setting, by controlling for
possible confounding factors, including fixed time-invariant individual characteristics.
Formally, the effect of a treatment (Treat) on an outcome (Y) can be tested through the
model:
Yit = α + βT reatit +γP ostit + ρ(P ost ∗ T reat)it + δXi + it (1)
where the subscripts i and t respectively refer to prisoners and periods (surveys); α
represent the constant term; P ost is the time dummy, taking value 1 for observations
belonging to the second survey and zero otherwise; T reat is the treatment dummy; Xi
are individual inmates’ characteristics; and it is the usual error term, while β, γ , ρ
and δ are the parameters to be estimated. The ATT effect is estimated by the coefficient
ρ. Formally, being g the groups in our sample, namely treated (T), waiting (W), and
the wider control group (N+W) and t the two surveys (1 and 2), then ρ is defined as
follows25:
ρ = (E[Yigt |g = T ,t = 2]−E[Yigt |g = T ,t = 1])
−(E[Yigt |g =W,t = 2]−E[Yigt |g =W,t = 1])
(2)
A DID can be estimated in a regression framework by creating dummy variables for
g and t. In this way it is possible to estimate a model that fully takes into account a set
of possible confounding factors.
4.2 Data and variables
Equation 1 is applied to the analysis of both the outcome of the Dictator Game and the
Trust Game. In the Dictator Game, the outcome (i.e. the number of soups sent to the
Respondent) is transformed an indicator of the relative endowment (within the range
0-1) that the inmate shares with the anonymous partner. Analogously, the Trust Game
yields a discrete outcome expressed in number of soups (between 1 and 10) that has
been re-arranged in relative terms, into the 0-1 range.
The benchmark model of our analysis includes control variables related to the
following individual characteristics that could affect the inmate’s attitude to trust other
people:
25The same applies to the wider control group (N+W).
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• age declared by inmate as of July 2016 (age);
• a dummy variable, coded 1 if inmates was not involved in a stable relationship, i.e.
whether he was not married, separated/divorced, engaged or widowed (single);
• a control for personal preferences for soups (soup like);
• a control for the value of soups as means of exchange, independently of individual
tastes (soup value).
In an extended specification, we also included dummies for ethnic identity, to
control for possible cross-ethnic heterogeneity that could affect the propensity to trust
an anonymous partner26.
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the individual characteristics of the
treated and of the two control groups (N+W and W); Table 2 records mean comparison
tests for all three samples. In particular, the last three columns show that no significant
differences occur between Treated and control groups on the main covariates, with the
sole exception of soup like.
Table 1: Summary of samples characteristics, at baseline
T Group
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
age 42 43.86 9.03 22 59
single 42 0.57 0.50 0 1
soup like 41 5.44 3.08 1 10
soup value 41 5.59 3.54 1 10
N+W Group
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
age 38 47.00 9.42 26 63
single 38 0.50 0.51 0 1
soup like 38 7.26 2.83 1 10
soup value 38 6.39 2.95 1 10
W Group
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
age 22 47.59 8.63 30 63
single 22 0.59 0.50 0 1
soup like 22 7.64 2.77 1 10
soup value 22 6.32 2.95 1 10
Furthermore, since the literature (e.g. Camerer, 2003; Johnson and Mislin, 2011)
suggests that the outcome of a Trust Game can be actually driven by pure altruism
rather than trust, in order to estimate the effect of pure altruism on trust, we provide
an augmented version of our benchmark model that also include the outcome of the
Dictator Game as measured in the first survey.
Finally, since the experiment is repeated twice, we take into account possible
autocorrelation of the error term at the individual level. To tackle this issue, all models
are estimated with robust standard errors, clustered at the inmates’ level.
26Ethnic group identities are self-reported by inmates by choosing among not mutually exclusive
categories, hence all included in the model estimation, taken from the US Census official definition of
ethnic and racial groups as mandated by the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) 1997 standards.
For further information see https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/meta/long_RHI225215.htm
11
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Table 2: T-tests, by treatment group at baseline
Sample means Mean comparison T-tests
Variable T (N+W) W T/(N+W) T/W W/N
age 43.86 47.00 47.59 −3.143 −3.734 1.403
single 0.57 0.50 0.59 0.071 −0.020 0.216
soup like 5.44 7.26 7.64 −1.824*** −2.197*** 0.886
soup value 5.59 6.39 6.32 −0.809 −0.733 −0.182
Ethnic Groups
White 0.40 0.34 0.41 0.063 −0.004 0.159
Native American/Alaska 0.12 0.13 0.14 −0.013 −0.017 0.011
Hawaiian Native/Pacific 0.10 0.11 0.14 −0.010 −0.041 0.074
Asian 0.10 0.13 0.14 −0.036 −0.041 0.011
Black/African American 0.33 0.34 0.45 −0.009 −0.121 0.267*
Hispanic/Latino 0.48 0.53 0.45 −0.050 0.022 −0.170
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
5 Results and discussion
5.1 Main results
Figure 1 illustrates the distributions of the inmates’ choices in the Trust Game, by
survey and treatment group. While the wider (N+W) control group in the upper and
lower panel report similar distributions, the distribution for the Treated group is clearly
different in survey 1 and survey 2, showing that Treated inmates, after the program,
actually reported very different answers27.
Table 3 reports the results of the benchmark models’ estimations: model (1) shows
that, after the completion of the GRIP Program, the Treated inmates significantly
increased the fraction sent to the anonymous partner by 0.184, as shown by the ATT
coefficient in Table 3 (corresponding to a 20 per cent increase of the initial amount,
given that soups were only available as integer numbers). This finding is robust to the
identification of alternative control groups, as shown in model (2): the size of the two
coefficients is substantially comparable, since both can be converted into an average
increase of about 2 soups 28. As far as covariates are concerned29, Trust is negatively
associated with age, although the size of the coefficient is very small. Furthermore,
single is highly significant and negatively associated with Trust, suggesting that
the absence of involvement in a stable romantic relationship (either present or past,
successful or unsuccessful) signals a less trustful attitude (in the Sutter and Kocher,
2007 sense). The benchmark model’s estimations thus support the occurrence of a
“trust-increasing” effect of GRIP in participant inmates.
27This “at a glance” evidence is supported by a Kruskal-Wallis test’s p-values, equals to 0.66 for the
Treated and to 0.23 for the Control group. An almost identical result is obtained through a Wilkoxon
rank-sum test.
28In fact - since dehydrated soups (the goods used in the actual lab-experiment) are indivisible - the
two coefficients may be interpreted as identical.
29Table 3 does not report further alternative specifications that include also the payoff earned in the
first survey: this variable is not significant, implying that the time interval between the two sessions is
large enough to cancel out potential “memory effect” of the previous payoff.
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Figure 1: Trust Game: distribution of inmates’ choices
Since the observed outcome of a Trust Game can be driven by alternative multiple
motivations, such as other-regarding preferences, and beliefs over the trustworthiness
of the anonymous partner (Sapienza et al., 2013; Fehr, 2009), we estimate the effect
of pure altruism on trust (Rabin, 1993) by including the outcome of a Dictator Game.
In this way, we devise an “augmented” model in which an endogenously determined
attitude of the participants is included as a covariate for trust.
Before moving to the augmented specification of our model, we tested the effect
of GRIP on the outcome of the Dictator game through a DID estimation. As models
(3) and (4) in Table 3 show, the ATT coefficient is not significant in the benchmark
model for the two control groups30. Thus, the augmented specification of the DID
model presented in Table 4 treats altruism as an endogenously determined individual
attitude and includes it among the covariates at the value observed at the first survey.
30This result is robust for alternative model specifications, including an extended set of covariates to
control for ethnicity, and no covariates at all. Furthermore, both the Wilckoxon rank-sum and Kruskal-
Wallis tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that the distributions of altruism for Treated and Controls
are different across surveys.
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Table 3: Benchmark models’ results: Trust and Dictator, Difference-in-Differences
Dep. Var: Trust Dictator
Control Group: (N+W) W (N+W) W
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ATT 0.184** 0.212** 0.119 0.132
(0.075) (0.087) (0.073) (0.090)
age −0.008*** −0.008*** −0.004 −0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
single −0.146*** −0.133** −0.118** −0.127**
(0.049) (0.059) (0.047) (0.053)
prison dummy 0.018 −0.020 −0.088* −0.150***
(0.054) (0.060) (0.050) (0.052)
soup value 0.001 0.006 −0.006 0.003
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 158 126 158 126
Adj. R-squared 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.09
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at prisoners’ level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 4: Augmented Trust results: Difference-in-Differences.
Dep. var.: Trust including altruism including altruism & ethnic groups
Control Group: (N+W) W (N+W) W
Model: OLS GLM OLS GLM OLS GLM OLS GLM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ATT 0.184** 0.171*** 0.212** 0.199*** 0.184** 0.172*** 0.212** 0.201***
(0.075) (0.061) (0.087) (0.072) (0.077) (0.060) (0.090) (0.072)
altruism 0.377*** 0.407*** 0.375*** 0.414*** 0.370*** 0.395*** 0.300** 0.343**
(0.091) (0.101) (0.116) (0.123) (0.091) (0.105) (0.131) (0.143)
age −0.006** −0.007** −0.006* −0.006* −0.006** −0.007** −0.006* −0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
single −0.138*** −0.142*** −0.122** −0.127** −0.143*** −0.140*** −0.140** −0.142***
(0.042) (0.044) (0.051) (0.053) (0.046) (0.046) (0.055) (0.054)
prison dummy 0.038 0.045 0.024 0.036 0.024 0.027 −0.013 −0.011
(0.047) (0.049) (0.055) (0.058) (0.045) (0.048) (0.056) (0.059)
soup value 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.011 0.013
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
White 0.043 0.046 0.071 0.069
(0.052) (0.059) (0.062) (0.065)
Native American/ −0.023 −0.028 −0.109 −0.095
Alaska (0.074) (0.071) (0.099) (0.103)
Hawaiian Native/ −0.009 −0.009 0.039 0.026
Pacific (0.113) (0.158) (0.135) (0.166)
Asian −0.020 −0.043 −0.015 −0.033
(0.087) (0.105) (0.137) (0.133)
Black/ −0.079 −0.074 −0.079 −0.083
African American (0.053) (0.065) (0.058) (0.068)
Hispanic/ 0.038 0.038 0.060 0.047
Latino (0.050) (0.058) (0.065) (0.071)
Observations 158 158 126 126 158 158 126 126
Adj. R-squared 0.21 0.17 0.21 0.18
McFadden R-Sq. 0.12 0.29 0.13 0.31
AIC 0.974 1.009 1.037 1.086
BIC −695.2 −516.7 −666.8 −490
Treatment and time dummies included. Clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
OLS and GLM for the binomial family (link function: logit): for GLM models, the table reports marginal effects.
15
CSCC Working Papers 01/17
In the augmented specification, as shown in Table 4, models (1) to (4) include the
same covariates as in Table 3 as well as the endogenous proxy for altruism; models
(5) to (8) also include dummy variables for self-reported ethnic identities. For all
specifications, the table reports the coefficients for both the wider control group (N+W)
and the subsample of motivated inmates (W). Finally, all specifications are estimated
both through standard OLS, as common practice in the field, and through GLM for the
binomial family with a logit link function. The latter estimation technique has been
implemented following the suggestions by Papke and Wooldridge (1996), for bounded
dependent variables31. ATT, the Average Treatment effect on the Treated, is always
positive and significant and it is robust to different model specifications. The coefficient
of altruism is positive and significant, as expected.
In the extended version of the model reported on columns (5) to (8), none of the
group dummies is significant, allowing to exclude effects of ethnic differences on
trust32.
One may raise a concern on whether inmates - despite being told they were interact-
ing with a real person, who had played the same games in a previously administered
session, whose answers were recorded in the “reward booklet” - were actually believing
to be matched with real persons, rather than simulated ones. Previous behavioral
(Bottom et al., 2006) and neuroscience (Sanfey et al., 2003) studies show that people
behave differently according to their believes about the nature of partners (real vs.
simulated persons). Empirical evidence shows that being convinced of playing against
a machine or a simulated person exerts a downward bias on the fraction sent in the
Trust Game (Johnson and Mislin, 2011, p. 873).
However this does not hinder our results for a twofold reason: firstly, since our
research design entails a DID, any potential downward bias occurring in both surveys is
eliminated by the estimation technique; secondly, any residual downward effect would
a fortiori strengthen our results.
5.2 Robustness checks
Another potential concern for the results shown in Table 4 is related to possible self-
selection bias in the control group. As a robustness check we provide a Propensity
Score Matching (PSM) procedure for the results. PSM is an estimation technique to
evaluate the effectiveness of treatment in observational studies, extensively used since
the seminal work by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). The aim is to estimate ATT by
comparing treated and controls, conditioning on a set of relevant covariates (Caliendo
and Kopeinig, 2008; Becker et al., 2002). In order to proceed with the test we ignore
31In fact our dependent variable is the fraction of soups sent to the other person and is therefore
constrained within the range 0-1. Some researchers addressed this issue by implementing a Tobit model,
but Papke and Wooldridge (1996) showed that censored regression techniques do not apply for variables
with infeasible values beyond the censoring point. Therefore, GLM models are included in the table as a
robustness check.
32Burks et al. (2003, p. 196-7) show that “Non-White participants exhibit less trust than whites in
a mostly white environment”. In our case, however, one should consider that the incarceration rate in
the USA is higher for ethnic minorities. In an alternative model specification, not reported here, we run
the same models as in columns (1) to (4) including a single ethnic dummy for Non-White inmate: the
coefficient is always never statistically significant.
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the pre-/post- treatment design and consider only the outcomes of Trust in the second
survey, by conditioning them on inmates’ individual characteristics. The Propensity
Score, i.e. the probability of being part of the Treated group, is therefore calculated
by balancing the same covariates that we include in extended model specification
(columns 5 to 8 in Table 4)33. By imposing “common support” on Treated and Control,
the actual matching will consider only Treated and Control with propensity scores
within the range of the control group values. In this way, potential outliers in the
Treated group are ignored, and the estimated ATT is robust to potential unobserved
self-selection mechanisms.
Table 5: Robustness check: Propensity Score Matching, dep. var.: trust
Matching method: NN† Radius† Kernel‡
(1) (2) (3)
ATT 0.188** 0.173** 0.109
(0.094) (0.082) (0.077)
T-stat 2.00 2.10 1.42
Observations 79 79 79
Controls 20 29 37
Treated 41 32 41
Note: common support always requested; balancing property satisfied.
Covariates: altruism, age, single, soup value, ethnic group dummies.
Standard errors (†) or Bootstrap standard errors (‡) in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Once the propensity score has been calculated34 and the balancing property suc-
cessfully tested, the choice of the matching algorithm is of pivotal importance since
it affects both the bias and efficiency of the estimated ATT (Caliendo and Kopeinig,
2008). For this reason, Table 5 reports the estimated ATT according to three alterna-
tive matching algorithms extensively applied in the PSM literature, namely: 1-to-1
Nearest-Neighbor (NN), Radius Caliper and Kernel35.
Model (1) and (2), shown in Table 5, report statistically significant ATT coefficients,
very close to those estimated in Table 4 (ranging from 0.17 to 0.19) and rely on algo-
rithms that are based on similar procedures, identifying the most suitable observation
in the control group for each treated one. These procedures are the most straight-
forward application of PSM and allow to compare similar individuals. For sake of
completeness, column (3) in Table 5 reports the estimation of the ATT when the Kernel
technique is applied. The lack of statistical significance in the Kernel model estimation
is likely to be driven by the fact that this technique uses all the available information
to generate the counterfactual outcome for the treated, thus including also potential
“bad matches”, i.e. controls with propensity scores very far from the treated (Caliendo
and Kopeinig, 2008). Therefore, PSM overall confirms and strengthens our main result,
33Due to the limited size of the sample, the prison dummy has been not included since it would have
further reduced the number of available propensity scores for the matching. All other covariates are
indeed included in the propensity score estimation.
34The results of the logit estimation are shown in the Appendix.See Table A2
35See Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for a survey of pros and cons of different matching algorithms.
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supporting the evidence that trust, as measured by the fraction of soups sent to an
anonymous partner in the Trust Game, increased in inmates participating to GRIP.
6 Conclusions
The present study tests whether GRIP, a specific offender accountability program for
long-term sentenced inmates, implemented in two Californian State Prisons (Avenal
and Mule Creek), changes the prosocial behavioral attitudes of inmates. The paper
describes the results of a Lab-in-the-Field experiment, based on a longitudinal design
spanning over a period of 10 months with a specific focus on trust. The research
protocol envisaged the administration of two questionnaires including a set of behav-
ioral situations (“games”), widely used in the experimental and behavioral economics
literature, namely the Dictator Game (Kahneman et al., 1986) and the Trust Game
(Berg et al., 1995), to 80 inmates, 42 treated (enrolled in the program) and 38 controls.
The first questionnaire was administered before the start of the program; the second
questionnaire at the end of the program.
A DID estimation procedure shows that trust significantly increased in GRIP partic-
ipants compared to the control group. This result is robust to alternative estimation
techniques and to the inclusion of an endogenous behavioral measure of altruism
(measured by a Dictator Game).
The results of the paper support the claim that an offender accountability program,
such as GRIP, produces beneficial effects on the inmates’ prosocial preferences and
attitudes beyond its primary aims. A wider application of these programs can thus
be thought as an effective instrument, in the short-term, to re-establish or strengthen
prosocial behavior in inmates and, in the long term, to facilitate rehabilitation processes
by fostering inmates’ reintegration and re-socialization in their communities, thus
potentially contributing to the reduction of recidivism.
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A Correlation matrix
Table A1: Pairwise correlation of main variables





single −0.234 −0.002 −0.114
(0.003) (0.982) (0.151)
soup like 0.027 −0.119 0.206 −0.118
(0.738) (0.135) (0.009) (0.139)
soup value 0.076 −0.14 −0.005 -0.202 0.350
(0.345) (0.079) (0.952) (0.011) (0.000)
P-values in parentheses.
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B Propensity Score estimation

























Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Note: Logit estimation, marginal effects reported.
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.2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated: On support
Treated: Off support
Figure 2: Estimated Propensity Scores: Common Support
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C Supplementary materials
C.1 Survey instructions
Before each session of the survey begins, the following instructions are read aloud by
the interviewer and handed in to inmates (below horizontal line):
Welcome and thank you for participating in this survey.
Your choices and answers will be treated in a strictly anonymous manner. Your
name will not appear in the survey and will not be attached in any way to your answers.
The interviewers are students who will not be involved in any further stage of the
survey. Results will be used and published in an anonymous way.
We are interested in checking some factors that influence the way people make
decisions. During the survey you will be asked to answer some questions and asked to
make decisions in a number of situations. In one of these situations you must decide
individually; in another one, your answer will be matched with that of another person
who has already performed this task. This interaction will take place in a completely
anonymous way. The identity of the other person will never be revealed, either during
or after the end of the survey.
The other person has received these same instructions. During the survey you will
be asked to make some choices. The choices you make will give you the opportunity
to receive a certain number of dried soups. In the situation involving an individual
decision, your choice will directly determine the number of earned dried soups. In the
situation where you will be matched with another person, your choice will be combined
with the choice made by the other person and will determine the final number of dried
soups you receive.
You will answer some questions and make decisions in 2 situations. Each decision
will get you a number of dried soups. At the end of the survey, one situation out of
the two will be randomly selected (through a coin toss).This will determine how many
soups you will ultimately receive. Immediately at the end of the survey, you will receive
the number of dried soups earned in the selected situation.
For the participation to the survey, you will get a gift.
During this session you will be asked to:
1. fill in the survey;
2. make your choices in a 6 different situations.
Overall, the session will last approximately twenty minute. We ask you to work
alone and in silence.
Thank you for your participation!
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C.2 Tutorial Booklet
Starting from the following page we present the tutorial booklet that includes visual
instruction of the incentivized tasks (Dictator Game and Trust Game), illustrated to





















In this situation you are interacting with another anonymous person, whose 
identity will not be revealed, either during or after the end of the survey. The same 
applies to the other person: he will never know who you are. A different role will 
be assigned to each of you. You have been assigned to be Person A. 
 
You are provided with 10 dried soups, while Person B is provided with none. You 
must decide how many dried soups to give to Person B. 
 
Eventually you will obtain the initial amount of dried soups minus the dried soups 
you have given to Person B. 
 
Person B will get the dried soups that you have decided to give to him. 
Section 1: INSTRUCTION 
You have been assigned to be Person A. 
You are endowed with 10 dried soups. 
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In this situation you are interacting with another anonymous person, whose 
identity will not be revealed either during or after the end of the survey. The same 
applies to the other person: he will never know who you are. A different role will 
be assigned to each of you. You have been assigned to be Person A. 
 
You have been provided with 10 dried soups as initial endowment. You have to 
decide if keeping these dried soups for yourself or giving part or all of them to 
Person B. 
 
All the dried soups that you choose to give will be tripled; so for every dried soup 
you decide to give, Person B will receive 3 dried soups. Once the other person has 
received the dried soups that you have decided to give him (multiplied by three), 
he will have to decide in turn if and how many dried soups to give back to you. At 
the end, you will obtain: 
 
• The amount of dried soups equal to 10 (the initial endowment) 
• Minus the amount of dried soups you give to him 
• Plus the amount of dried soups that he has decided to give you back. 
Section 2: INSTRUCTION 
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C.3 Dictator Game questionnaire
Section 1
In this situation you are interacting with another anonymous person, whose identity
will not be revealed, either during or after the end of the survey. The same applies to
the other person: he will never know who you are. A different role will be assigned to
each of you. You have been assigned to be Person A.You are provided with 10 dried
soups, while Person B is provided with none. You must decide how many dried soups
to give to Person B. Eventually you will obtain the initial amount of dried soups minus
the dried soups you have given to Person B.
Person B will get the dried soups that you have decided to give to him.
How many dried soups do you choose to give to the other person?
Please choose only one of the following, by ticking the appropriate circle:
© 0 dried soups
© 1 dried soup
© 2 dried soups
© 3 dried soups
© 4 dried soups
© 5 dried soups
© 6 dried soups
© 7 dried soups
© 8 dried soups
© 9 dried soups
© 10 dried soups
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C.4 Trust Game questionnaire
Section 2
In this situation you are interacting with another anonymous person, whose identity
will not be revealed either during or after the end of the survey. The same applies to
the other person: he will never know who you are. A different role will be assigned
to each of you. You have been assigned to be Person A. You have been provided with
10 dried soups as an initial gift. You have to decide if keeping these dried soups for
yourself or giving part or all of them to Person B. All the dried soups that you choose to
give will be tripled; so for every dried soup you decide to give, Person B will receive 3
dried soups. Once the other person has received the dried soups that you have decided
to give him (multiplied by three), he will have to decide in turn if and how many dried
soups to give back to you.
At the end, you will obtain:
– The amount of dried soups equal to 10 (the initial endowment);
– Minus the amount of dried soups you give to him;
– Plus the amount of dried soups that he has decided to give you back.
How many of your 10 dried soups do you decide to give to the other
person?
Please choose only one of the following, by ticking the appropriate circle:
© 0 dried soups
© 1 dried soup
© 2 dried soups
© 3 dried soups
© 4 dried soups
© 5 dried soups
© 6 dried soups
© 7 dried soups
© 8 dried soups
© 9 dried soups
© 10 dried soups
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C.5 Questions related to preferences for soups
To obtain information about preferences and value attached to soups by inmates, at the
end of the survey the following questions were provided (below horizontal line):
Conclusion
Thanks for participating in this survey.
Before submitting the survey, please answer the following questions:
1. How much do you like dried soups? Please choose the appropriate
answer by ticking the appropriate item
(1 = Don’t like them at all, 10 = Like them very much)
I don’t like I like them
them at all very much
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
© © © © © © © © © ©
2. Apart from your personal consumption, how much dried soups can
be valuable for you? Please choose the appropriate answer by ticking
the appropriate item
(1 = Not valuable at all, 10 = Very valuable)
Soups are not Soups are
valuable at all very valuable
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
© © © © © © © © © ©
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C.6 Reward Booklet
Starting from the following page we present an example of the reward booklets used in
the survey.
Each booklet reports different values, depending on the real choices made by the
anonymous partners in a previous survey.
The first page of the booklet include an alphanumeric code relating to the anony-
mous partner: the answers included in the booklet refer to this specific person. Both
situation 1 and situation 2 in the booklet include a self-explanatory table to allow the
interviewer to perform the rewarding procedure. The numbers in the table presented
in situation 2 vary according to the choices made by each anonymous partner and are
therefore different each booklet.








PERSON B’s CHOICES 
 




TO THE INTERVIEWER, VERY IMPORTANT: 
At the end of the survey, the prisoner tosses a plastic coin.  
The number marked on the UP side will indicate which section of the survey will be 
rewarded.  
Go to the corresponding page:  
• If coin toss yields 1, go to page 1 
• If coin toss yields 2, go to page 2 
 
Then follow the instruction to correspond the correct reward! 
 
CSCC Working Papers 01/17
42
PAYOFF INSTRUCTION  1 
 
 
If coin toss yields 1 
The situation to be rewarded is Section 1. 
 
INSTRUCTION FOR THE INTERVIEWER: 
1. Go to Section 1 of the GRIP-CSCC Survey filled in by the inmate: this section involves 
Person A’s choice only.  
2. Identify the prisoner’s answer in the  grey column  of the REWARD TABLE below. 
3. Read the corresponding reward in the white column  and circle the reward. 



















5. Reward the prisoner with the correct amount of soups. 
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PAYOFF INSTRUCTION  2  
 
 
If coin toss yields 2 
The situation to be rewarded is Section 2. 
Person B has made his choice about how many soups 
sending back to Person A (the prisoner).  
The choices of both A and B generate the following 





by Person B 
0 0 1 2 3 3 4 3 3 3 
Person A’s 
answer 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Person A’s 
REWARD 
9 8 8 8 8 7 7 5 4 3 
 
 
INSTRUCTION FOR THE INTERVIEWER: 
1. Go to Section 2 of the GRIP-CSCC Survey filled in by the prisoner and read Person A’s 
answer. 
2. Identify Person A’s answer in the  grey row . 
3. The reward is given by the number reported in the corresponding   white cell  right 
below Person A’s answer. 
4. Circle the reward cell. 
5. Show the outcome to the inmate, in order to make clear to him the way he has been 
rewarded. 
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C.7 Plastic coin
Figure 3: Side 1 (head) and side 2 (tail) of the plastic coin used in the rewarding
procedure
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